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Economics has long been the study of maximizing production, minimizing cost, 
and analyzing distributions, but it was not until recently that the field of economics added 
the social institution of the family and sUbjective well being to its list. What is being 
expounded upon within this discussion is how marital happiness affects family 
economics. The question begins with how marriage affects the basic micro model of 
economics: utility, and in turn how marital happiness affects economic decisions made by 
the family, such as the amount of leisure and goods to consume. 
Economic issues already analyzed within the family include joint and independent 
utility functions, the joint production function, distribution of economic resources, exiting 
constraints and more. The addition to the economic community that this discussion will 
be making hinges on a closer look at marriages shared goods; a good that can only be 
consumed within marriage, either produced by one spouse and consumed by the other or 
shared by both. From the shared good, we can analyze if happiness within marriage 
changes choices between shared goods, leisure, and private consumption, which in turn 
affects the personal or joint utility function when married. 
The pUrpose of studying happiness within marriage for an economist when 
looking at it from the bigger picture is that it adds insights into the complex economic 
institution that would not otherwise be observable. The insights include how the 
complicated interplay of the resources allocated to shared goods and the leisure to 
consume them, is exchanged between private consumption. So, marital happiness, as it 
affects utility produced within marriage, can inflti~nc~' a variety of decisions. These broad 
definitions of goods once analyzed generically can define more specific issues such as 
economies of scale, income transfers, labor force participation decisions, human capital 
investments, and large ticket items such as a house or arguably children. In effect a 
happy marriage is not just interesting to sociologists and those who are married but gives 
insights into economic issues as well. 
The layout of this paper will be as follows. In the second section there will be a 
literature review to highlight important points from which to construct the model and add 
to the discussion. In the third section the model will be developed and used to express 
how marital happiness changes family economics. In section four I will look at the data 
and its econometric results to support the model and then conclude. Appendix B will 
outline the idea of happiness as an endogenous decision. 
II. Literature Review 
There are three main Qodies of literature that play an important part in analyzing 
the question of how happiness affects the distribution of goods within households. Those 
topics are: the effects of economic variables on subjective well-being, resource allocation 
within the family, and family bargaining. 
Marcus Aurelius, the scholar and emperor of Rome wrote, "No man is happy who 
does not think himself so." Happiness is subjective, wrote Campbell (1976). In addition, 
Shin and Johnson have written that subjective well-being is "a global assessment of a 
person's quality of life according to his own chosen criteria." In explaining the 
subjective evaluation of one's happiness, scholars:'ortelf use the term "personality." 
Whitney (1976) claims demographic variables explain only 10% of happiness, while 
L 
personality is what is often characterized as making up most of the other 90%. 
Personality has many definitions but generally includes ones self-esteem, extraversion or 
sociability, androgyny, and others. Therefore in trying to measure happiness there are 
two important things to note. First is none of us are exactly the same, we can only be 
characterized on an individual basis, and second is, we all have a few minor similarities 
from which we can explain the overall composition. Therefore, when analyzing 
happiness, one can find results that are significant but cannot measure precisely. 
Turning from a sociological perspective, the economics community has given 
increased attention to the study of happiness. One approach taken is that of comparison; 
people evaluate their happiness dependent upon the people around them, Smith (1989). 
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In a slight alteration, Easterlin (1974, 1995) describes happiness in terms of reaching 
aspirations or expectations. Unified theories of happiness have been discussed but what 
dominates the field is empirical work. Finding economic indicators of happiness has 
gained importance in understanding subjective well being. Economic indicators that have 
been found to .be significant in explaining personal happiness are inflation (Oswald 
1999), the unemployment rate (Di Tella 2001), residence in richer countries (Diener 
1986), personal unemployment (MacCulloch and Oswald 2001), job satisfaction (Frey 
2001), and financial well being (Waitte 2000). 
Explaining happiness is important, but it is also important to understand how it 
influences decisions that are made by each individual. Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 
(1997) distinguish useful variations within this evaluation of utility. For example, being 
happy in one's marriage is a central aspiration fo?Am.ei1cans. Researchers (e.g., Glenn) 
report that over 90% of Americans identify "having a happy marriage" as one of the most 
important, or a very important, life objective. It follows that people who are not happy 
within marriage opt out. 
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Looking at both marriage and happiness one can find a variety of issues. At a 
basic level, studies of happiness have found those who are married are happier then those 
who are single, Glenn (1975). Some scholars feel there are selection effects that cause 
married persons to be happier, but overall, the consensus is that the effects of the marital 
relationship is stronger, (Glenn and Weaver, 1988). 
Changing gears to a more encompassing discussion of economics and the family, 
Blau and Ferber give a comprehensive neo-classical economic outline of the benefits and 
costs of marriage in their book The Economics o/Women, Men, and Work. To begin, 
they stipulate that there is a contract, which is proven to serve as a business agreement 
and therefore makes the union one not only of love but economics. They describe the 
benefits from marriage as comparative advantage, economies of scale, public goods, 
externalities, and risk sharing. The costs of marriage include sharing housework, 
bargaining costs, friction caused by life cycle changes, and loss of independence. 
The Nobel Prize winning economist Gary Becker in his two part series "A Theory 
of Marriage" discusses comparative advantage. In the first article he looks at marriage as 
defining a family production unit. He expounds upon marginal rates of substitution to 
explain increasing gains in marriage and goes on to show the joint production function 
must produce more than if both individuals were single. In the second part of his series 
on "A Theory of Marriage" he wrote of caring and its ability to optimize a joint utility 
curve shared by everyone within the family. He &adeseveral points to support the union 
of utility, primarily from the hypothesis that those who care for each other would have a 
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utility function dependent upon the others utility. Also, Becker concludes the joint utility 
curve is best because of its added utility from the reduction on exchange costs within the 
household. His idea was one utility function and one production function. Note there 
have been several studies by Pollak and others on how realistic it is to assume that the 
decisions are being made by one altruistic spouse. These studies have influenced social 
policy. For example, income transfers to lower income families are generally given to 
mothers, because they spend it more often on the family and children rather then on 
private consumption. 
An important alteration from Becker's joint utility and joint production function 
came with McElroy and Homey (1981), and Manser and Brown (1980). They both 
expressed a separate utility function for each spouse and used a game theory setting to 
disperse the goods produced jointly. They centered their game on the fact that the 
difference between the utility of being married and the utility of being single must be 
greater than zero for· both persons to stay married. To describe the threat point they must 
consider the cost of divorce and the difference in utility of marriage and being single. 
Elizabeth Peters explains a more general framework for exiting a marriage within 
the context of unilateral divorce laws. In her view, which takes as given perfect 
information on alimony, the couple will choose divorce if the sum of both of their 
benefits from being single is greater than the sum of both benefits from remaining 
together. 
Blau and Ferber consider a more dynamic model in terms of the joint production 
function and exiting. They point out that some sp6u~es decide to stay home because it 
l 
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produces more utility, but it costs them professional opportunities or market wages in the 
long run. 
The third branch of literature introduces a shared good to the analysis of 
household decision making. A pure public good is one that once provided, the additional 
cost of another person consuming the good is zero, and the prevention of someone else 
consuming it is very expensive or impossible. The goods exchanged between married 
couples are not necessarily a pure public good and therefore have been referred to as 
shared goods, though these goods have public good characteristics. A house and children 
are examples of the close alignment between the shared and public good because both 
spouses' consume the good at little or no expense to the other. Other goods shared are 
ones bought by one and consumed by the other. It is a marriage good from which both 
are presumably receiving utility, and therefore is a shared good. An example would be a 
diamond necklace or a nice tie before going to a Christmas party. On a technical basis, 
many economists model the shared good as a purchased good and use a constant price in 
their function while others define it as a home produced good 1• 
The shared goods are significant and become complicated in a bargaining 
perspective. Who pays for what, and how much do you buy? There are several theories 
that propose answers within the joint decision making model. Three of the different 
views are the joint utility function, by Gary Becker, the individual utility function by 
Manser and Brown where they outline the threat point as divorce and use a cooperative 
Nash bargaining model, and a Nash-Cournot solution by Chen and Woolley. In any case, 
the shared good is an important component of mJrl;ge. It is important because it is 
necessary to make decisions concerning their purchases of goods which affect both 
I Manser !Brown and W. Keith Bryant respectively 
spouses, and in turn, is the good that ties together each spouse's utility function. 
Therefore, the economic interaction that links spouse's decisions is the shared good. 
III. The Model 
The background of family economics as outlined in the literature review has taken 
the complex institution of the family and broken it down into the regular variables known 
in economics. They include leisure, consumption goods-private and shared, and labor 
forcelhome production. The classic model Becker outlined has been used in many areas 
to analyze smaller and more direct issues of family economics. These areas are family 
size, intergenerational transfers, investment, risk aversion, and others. The study here is 
taking the basic model and tackling another important family issue: how happiness 
affects family economic decisions. It seems to be a .dangerous step away from economics 
and into sociology but it is imperative to show that some social factors matter in 
economic decisions. 
The model will hold together the heart of the discussion. Its fundamental 
characteristics of family economics, described in the form of a utility function, will 
address the question of how marital happiness affects the distribution and consumption of 
shared goods within the family. There are two main ideas in modeling family utility, an 
individual and a joint function as discussed in the literature review. The individual utility 
function will be used within this setting to analyze our question because within the 
economic community the individual function is thought of as the stronger of the two. 
The individual utility function in algebraic form is: 
Ui (Ci, Qi+Qj, li, Hi) (1) 
pCi+pXi~ (T - li-Vi) Wi+ (T-lj - Vj) Wj] e (2) 
Qi = Xi + G (Vi) (3) 
Where Ii represents leisure of spouse i where i = m,f. Ci equals goods privately 
consumed by person i, and Hi is marital happiness. In the budget constraint T is total 
number of hours in a day, w is the wage for each spouse, and p is the price of goods. 9 is 
an exogenous measure between zero and one, which is agreed upon at the beginning of 
the marriage, and splits the income between spouses. Note the choice variables made by 
individual j are exogenous and the budget constraint for person j would be multiplied by 
(1- 9) not 9. The final equation is an identity that represents the sum of the shared goods 
brought to the marriage by individual i. They are comprised of those bought, Xi, and 
home produced goods, G(Vi), where Vi represents time spent producing them. Again, the 
definition of the shared good is a good consumed within the marriage. It can be 
consumed mutually or produced/bought by one and consumed by the other. Both G and 
X are perfect substitutes. In anticipating analyzing the independent utility functions, the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be used to constrain decisions to be consistent with each 
other's. I will derive each spouse's decision, Qj, taking the others, Qj, as constant2. 
Marital happiness, Hj, will be considered an exogenous characteristic within the 
utility function when analyzed in the theoretical modee. The idea of it being exogenous 
is controversial, but is justified by an argument that considers time. The economic 
decisions people make effect happiness in the long run but may have no influence on 
marital happiness today. Therefore, marital happiness in this myopic game is the result 
of the accumulation of past decisions. If one arg~~;iliat goods bought today affect the 
2 A cooperative game has been studied thoroughly but in this circumstance no tractable solution has been 
found. Chen and Woolley have used the uncooperative idea in their recent article in the Economic Journal. 
3 Appendix B explores the idea of the endogeneity of happiness in marriage. 
-:: ... 
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level of happiness today then they are arguing happiness designates the optimal quantities 
of these goods. In effect, happiness outlines the functional form of the utility function 
and implies the variable is unnecessary. Yet, this argument does not work with examples 
like getting a college education. A decision about education is made to create happiness 
in the future by allowing for an increase in future choices, though it has no effect today. 
Therefore, happiness seems more plausibly exogenous in the short run due to everyone's 
inability to choose goods that affect it in the present. 
When solving for the effects of happiness on the distribution of goods it is 
necessary to find the first order conditions associated with each choice variable. The 
choice variables are Cj, Vi. and Ii. The variable Xi has been substituted out using the 
budget constraint. Therefore the first order conditions are: 
Uc;. - UQi = 0 (4) 
(-Wil p+ GVi) UQi ?! 0 (5) 
Uli - (Wi Ip) UQi = 0 (6) 
The marginal rates of substitution show the relationships between the choice variables. 
Equation four is the partial derivative with respect to private consumption, Eq. 5 is the 
parital with repect to Vi, and 6 is with respect to Ii. Since happiness is an exogenous 
variable, as it increases it effects the marginal rates of substitution differently. Under the 
assumptions that the partial derivative of marital happiness with respect to the marginal 
utility of the shared good is greater than zero (dUQ/dH > 0), and the partial derivative of 
happiness with respect to the marginal utility of private consumption equals zero 
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(dUddH = 0),4 then private consumption falls because of equation 4. Figure 1 
demonstrates this fact. As H rises then the choice variable C must fall in order to raise 
Uc and hold eqUality. Therefore moving the optimal choice from C* to C'. So in other 
words, marital happiness substitutes for private consumption and therefore less private 





The inequality for equation 5 represents the exchange between real wage and home 
productivity. It demonstrates that if one earns a higher wage at home then they work at 
home until the home wage falls to equal their real wage in the labor force. Once this 
happens they will work in the labor force where there is a constant and higher return on 
their marginal addition to labor. Note a corner solution is possible because for the 
amount of work an individual does it could be that the diminishing returns to home 
production does not lower the home wage enough to have a higher wage in the labor 
~ .; ; .... "'.~~. ""'." .. ~ . 
4 Many including Chen and Woolley split up the utility function into two pieces where utility equals V(C) + 
V(Q,H) to allow for a clearer understanding that the partial equal zero, but to save generality one equation 
is used here. 
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force, which would mean they would do all there work at home. The inverse is also true, 
or the labor force wage in real terms is always higher than home production. Finally the 
6th equation is ambiguous in how happiness affects leisure and shared goods. A graphic 
of this relationship is seen in Figure 2. One can see it depends upon how happiness shifts 
the marginal utility curve of leisure and shared goods. 1* is the initial equilibrium of 
leisure and as happiness rises the partial derivative of leisure rises shifting the curve from 
Al to A2, but also as happiness rises then the marginal utility of the shared good rises 
shifting the curve from BI to B2 or B3. Therefore the equilibrium point of leisure is 
ambiguous. It depends upon the magnitudes of the partial derivatives of martial 
happiness with respect to the marginal utility of leisure and shared consumption. So, the 




The next level to understand the relationship is using comparative statics. A 
break down of the shared good is necessary to make the implicit function tractable. In 
the previous section the underlying variable of the shared good is time spent producing 
these goods, whether within the home directly or in the labor force in order to buy them. 
Realize when given constant returns to scale of home production then shared goods can 
be represented as one choice variable because of equation 5, call the simplified version of 
the shared good Z.5 I will use Z for both spouses to represent the shared good Q in order 
to simplify the comparative static results. 
Under the assumption that maximization is feasible and the 2nd order conditions 
are met we can and will employ comparative statics. From Appendix A one can see the 
twenty-eight equations expressing these relationships. Only the variables dealing with 
happiness and its affect on shared goods will be analyzed. Again, the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium is being employed where the spouse's addition to the shared good is held 
constant. After the statics are analyzed the issue of the equilibrium between each 
spouse's shared contributions will be taken into account. 
The first step is explaining the signs ofthe partial derivatives. We must draw on 
assumptions from microeconomic theory to decide on the signs of the 2nd order 
derivatives. 
Ua:::, U11, Uzz, Uc:z < 0 <U Cl, UZlt Um, UlH (7) 
Explanation of these relationships is necessary. The partial derivatives below zero are 
negative from standard economic theory; the more goods an individual has the more 
utility he/she has but at a diminishing rate. Ucz is;{'arguably negative but observe they are 
5 Constant returns isn't imposed but in this situation it can be applied without loss in generality for the 
person at the comer where no home production is done, and little for the person at equality or the opposite 
comer, the home producer. 
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both goods. Uel and UZI are positive because they are complimentary goods. Marital 
happiness with respect to leisure (partly consumed with your spouse) and shared goods 
are positive because it is considered as an efficiency parameter. As happiness goes up 
then the utility from the shared goods and leisure goes up. The last sign condition is 
UcH ~ o. The idea was expressed previously. 
Looking specifically at the tradeoffs with respect to marital happiness and shared 
goods (dZ/dH) we find equation 8: 
dZi / dH = if Uil Uzh - if Ulh Uzl - P Uoc Ulh Wi + P Ucz Ulh Wi + 
Uoc Uzh wi + p Ucl (p Ulh - 2 Uzh Wi) (8) 
Notice if (w/p)UZH is larger than UIH then equation 8 is necessarily negative and the 
relationship dZ/dH > 0 because of the determinate, which was divided out initially to 
simplify the equation, is negative. The result is logical and the relationship was also 
expressed previously in Figure 2. 
Considering the relationship between personal consumption and marital happiness 
(dC/dH). 
dCi / dH = _p2 Uil Uzh + if Ulh Uzl + P Ucz Ulh Wi + P Uzh Uzl Wi - P Ulh Uzz Wi -
Ucz Uzh wi + p Ucl (-P Ulh + Uzh wi> (9) 
Again with the long equation the relationship is difficult to decipher. The equation also 
hinges upon the relationship (w/p)UZH > UIH. If true then as marital happiness rises 
private consumption falls, dC/dH < o. 
Leisure with respect to happiness (dt/dH) under the comparative static results are: 
dli / dH = p (p (Ucl Uzh - Uzh Uzl + Ulh UZZ) + Uoc (p Ulh - Uzh Wi) + 
Ucz (- 2 P Ulh + Uzh Wi) ) (10) 
Even after the algebraic simplification, the result takes another level of speculation in 
comparison to the previous two relationships, and therefore no sign will be determined. 
Since the trade off between leisure and private/shared goods is vague, empirical 
results will be analyzed to further highlight this relationship. Also, a magnitude will be 
identified of the relationship between private goods falling and shared goods rising. For 
example, if leisure is going up for one spouse then the purchases for that spouse must be 
going down, and private consumption is falling faster than shared consumption is rising 
due to the income constraint. The inverse is also true. 
In either analysis the last major issue with the individual model is if the quantity 
of shared goods rise in equilibrium. The answer lies at the intersection of the reaction 
functions: 
Qi = ti (p, Wi, Wj, Hi, Qj) 
Qj = tj (p, Wj, wi, Hj, Qi) 
(11) 
(12) 
Chen and Wooley have solved for a unique equilibrium and found the reaction functions 
are negatively sloped6. There are two possible solutions, an interior and a comer. The 
two solutions are represented graphically in Figures 3. Letting Qj's reaction function be 
constant then Q\ represents an interior solution at point "A" where the equilibrium is for 
individual i to purchase and/or produce Q*i and spouse j to share Q*j. At this point 
neither can do better. The alternative is a comer solution, which is represented by the 
reaction function QBj, and the equilibrium is point "B" where personj is the only one who 
purchases or produces shared goods, Q0j-
It is important to note that an argument could be made that if no shared goods are 
consumed or produced by individual j that are from i, then j is receiving nothing from i, 
or the marriage, and will choose to opt out but no.~e_ ~1 in some instances individuals 
receive utility when sharing with the other. 
6 Economic Journal, Oct. 2001 p. 722 
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Figure 3 
In either case there exists a threat point to leaving the marriage, where the utility from 
being married is less then being single, or married to someone else, then exit will ensue. 
The only way for one spouse to insure this does not happen is through increasing their Q. 
It is not the point to say that marriage will not exist above or at the threat point, but to say 
that there is at least one equilibrium for Q and Q must be greater then zero. 
If the happiness of one spouse increases then the spouses demand for shared 
goods rises. Therefore, a spouses' reaction function, depending upon the other spouses' 
shared good contribution, will shift out. Since the reaction functions are negatively 
sloped, then as one reaction function shifts out, the overall sum of Q will not necessarily 
increase because the other spouse will reduce their personal addition. Notice if the 
spouse on the vertical axis' slope is more than 45 degrees, or negative one at the point of 
equilibrium then it is impossible for the horizontal axis spouse to increase Q because 
every extra shared good they buy the other spouse will stop buying one or more. 
11 
Therefore, the necessary equilibrium under which the spouse will purchase more shared 
goods depends upon Qj. 
Further understanding can be gained. Remember there are two cases to consider 
due to the interior and corner solution. Considering the corner situation, if the interior 
reaction function shifts due to the change in happiness then nothing will happen unless it 
shifts out to create an interior solution. If the exterior persons reaction function shifts 
then the sum ofQ's will rise because it is the exterior spouse that determines the amount 
of shared goods. When the alternative interior solution exists, then under an additional 
stipulation that marital happiness for person "i" is positively correlated with person j 7 
then overall shared goods rise. Under the assumption then there will be a rise in shared 
goods as shown in Figure 4 from Qo to Q* because both reaction functions are shifting 
Figure 4 
I Quantity Qi J3" 
' ." .' "' . ..;: 
Q}' s reaction 
function 
7 The stipulation relies on the ideas that both spouses live through almost identical experiences and they 
affect each spouse in a similar manner. Therefore if an experience causes marital happiness to rise for one 
spouse then the other spouse's happiness is also rising. 
out. If happiness does not rise for the other spouse then the spouse's reaction function 
mayor may not shift out due to its dependence upon the choice made by their spouse. 
A corollary from this conclusion is the effect on the likelihood of divorce. In 
utility terms, Elizabeth Peters expresses the likelihood of divorce as: 
where a :t 0 if married (13) 
us 
M stands for the utility in marriage and S if single. What the model here has shown is as 
happiness in marriage increases then "a" is growing which makes the possibility of 
divorce smaller. Also, recognize if only one spouse's happiness rises and the other does 
not, and the reaction functions of the other spouses' yields no increase in shared goods, 
then this situation is not necessarily true. 
In conclusion of the theoretical section it has been found that as marital happiness 
rises then the demand for shared goods increases and the demand for private goods fall 
while leisure is ambiguous. Therefore the empirical section will use the General Social 
Survey to analyze the relationship between leisure and marital happiness. 
IV. Data and Econometric Results 
The data being analyzed is from the General Social Survey. The National 
Opinion Research Center (NaRC) located at the University of Chicago has administered 
the survey annually from 1972 to 1994 with the exceptions of 1979, 1981, and 1992, and 
then in even years since. The survey is cross-sectional and is administered in face-to-face 
interviews from approximately February 1 st to thl~e~ond week of April. They question 
approximately 1,500 people each year who are 18 and over in the 48 continental states. 
The central question in the GSS pertinent to this paper is the question on the 
subject's marital happiness. The question is posed 
Taken all together, how would you describe your marriage? Would you say that 
you are very happy (3), pretty happy (2), or not too happy (1)8? 
The question is answered by more than 99% of the married respondents. The question's 
reliability and validity have been extensively studied by Diner (1994) and Beethoven 
(1993) with respect to this surVeys measurement of personal subjective well being. Their 
results say the measurement is subjective but captures substantial amounts of variance on 
the respondent's feelings of happiness. In addition, they argue people usually try to 
balance happiness and unhappiness to take the overall picture when attempting to answer 
. the question. 
It is the purpose here only to use subjective well being data as a general insight 
into the process of choice. A countering point many economists argue is subjective 
happiness indicators are unimportant in comparison to studying the actual choices made 
by the individual. Choices are a more objective, calculable, and direct measure in 
analyzing the theory of optimizing utility functions. I use subjective indicators not as a 
final destination, but to extend the understanding of family economics and choices made 
within the institution from a more social interaction standpoint. The variable can be used 
to expose the complex structure of economic choices made within a family that is hard to 
observe because of the many issues that cloud choices. 
8 Histogram found in Appendix B 
L V 
Table 2 in appendix C shows sample statistics for the variables described in Table 
1 of the same appendix. Table 3 is the correlation matrix, and Table 4 the covariance 
matrix. 
The three observable goods that apply to the theoretical model include paid work 
hours, home production time, and marital happiness. The two dependent variables, work 
hours and home produced goods9, will be analyzed using OLS and then extended in using 
a variety of other econometric techniques to see if anything else can be added. Marital 
happiness will be used as an exogenous variable to explain the work decision 10. From the 
theoretical section this relationship will express the exchange between the rise of shared 
goods and the fall of private goods. 
The two dependent variables can be represented in functional form as: 
L = f (X, D, Hm) 
v = g (X, D, Hm) 
(14) 
(15) 
Where L is labor force participation, V is home production in hours, X is a vector of 
variables which include: 
age, age squared, age of spouse, children, education of respondent, family 
income, log of family income, financial relative position, personal income, race, 
respondent's employment status, spouses work hours, and sex 
The D's are: 
Occupation of respondent, year, and aggregate unemployment 
9 The home production question is asked for two years, 1994 and 1996. It has been weighted to 
acPproximate the work hours involved using "The Dollar Value of the Day." 
1 Appendix B 
L.l 
The D's have been separated out because, as footnoted above, happiness will be 
expressed as a dependent variable and we will use D as an instrument to eliminate 
correlation between error terms, or endogeneity, and produce consistent coefficientsll . 
The regression results are in Appendix C. In interpreting the results table 5.1 
estimates equation 14 for the entire sample using OLS. A few variables to note are that 
marital happiness is negative and significant. The sign is negative which was the 
question left unanswered in the theoretical section. Therefore, as happiness rises then 
people choose to work less outside in order to consume the happiness at home .. The log 
of family income is positive but the linear interpretation is negative, which is measuring a 
second derivative that is negative. The male demographic is positive, displaying the 
gender relationship within homes. Spouses work hours is positively correlated. 
Interesting but not surprising because those who work more are usually more ambitious 
and are attracted to or run in circles who have similar characteristics. 
Table 8.1 estimates equation 15 using OLS. Marital happiness is close to being 
negatively significant, but a likely explanation is there are some spouses' who are 
"trapped," meaning divorce is costly because of a low outside wage. Therefore they are 
doing all their work at home and are at a comer point from which they do not wish to 
move because their threat point is low, i.e. they have no outside optionsl2, but feel 
trapped within the marriage and therefore unhappy. Notice the positive relationship to 
children, the gender role, and a seemingly bargaining rule over the spouses' labor force 
participation. The R2 has fallen in comparison to wage hours but the variable is discrete 
and the variation is small. 
11 Realize in the sub-sample that year and aggregate unemployment will not be used. 
12 The coefficient is insignificant if the answer of doing all the work within the home is excluded. 
l 
L.L. 
In Table 5.2 the technique of censoring has been used. The idea behind it is the 
variable has a large cluster of people not working therefore the estimates will be weighted 
heavily at zero and using OLS will not estimate those not at zero with as accurate a 
variation as it could. Therefore the Censoring technique allows for a probabilistic 
function to take into account the large number of observations clustered together. One 
























Under further speculation, the zero significance measured in Table 8.1, which 
explains home produced goods and represents part of the shared good, does not contradict 
the model that as marital happiness rises then shared goods rise. The amount of home 
production should not change as martial happiness rises and therefore the zero 
significance is a good measure. In equation 5, the marginal home production and real 
wage equaled if the spouse was at the interior sohhfori::" Therefore, if a spouse is at an 
interior equilibrium or at the horizontal comer then there are decreasing marginal returns 
to home production. So, to increase shared goods the individual will buy them instead of 
produce them at home because they are cheaper due to the constant wage over price. 
Therefore relying more heavily upon table 5.1 we can see the relationship ofleisure. As 
marital happiness rises then. work hours, L, that are spent earning wages goes down, 
which due to the equality in equation 5 concludes logically that leisure rises. Therefore, 
the question, which was left open in the theoretical section, is answered. As happiness 
rises then leisure rises in order to consume the newly created happiness. Also, privately 
consumed goods are falling faster then shared goods are rising, due to the financial 
constraint. 
VI. Conclusion 
The study of marital happiness using an individual utility function under a Nash-
Cournot equilibrium produces several economic results. The exogenous variable impacts 
the resource distribution within the family through the three basic primary goods: 
privately consumed, shared cons~ption, and leisure. Theoretically, private 
consumption always falls and shared goods rise, provided there is a constant wage and 
price and that either marital happiness is correlated or there exists a particular comer 
solution. Empirically, the relationship of leisure displays a positive relationship. If 
happiness rises, then spouses spend more time at home consuming it, and consequently, 
on average, shared goods rise slower then private consumption falls. 
L4 
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Appendix A 
The Utility function is: 
Setting up the Lagranian: 
And its first order conditions are: 
Lei = Ui Ci - p).. =0 
LZ. = u~. - p).. =0 
l. l. 
L1i = Uili - .A =0 
LA = [[ (T- li) Wi + (T - lj) Wj] 9 - pCi - PZi] = 0 
And second orders: 
Uex: de +q Ucz dzi + Ucl dli - Pc ciA =- Ucz dzj - UcH dH 
90cz de +U zz dxi + 90zl dli - pdA = - Uzz dzj -U zH dH 
Ucl de +q Uzl dzi + Uil dli - ciA = - Uzl dzj - UlH dH 
- pdc - pdx - Wi dl = 
-(Wi+Wj) 9dT - 9 (T-li) dWi-9 (T - lj) dwj - [(T - 1i) Wi+ (T - lj) Wj] de+ (C+Z) dp 
In Matrix form as: 
Uee Uez Uel -p dej 
Uez Uzz Uzi -p dXj = 
Uel Ulz un -Wj dl j 
-p -p -Wj 0 dA. 
dz.i 
-Uez - Ueh 0 0 0 
0 0 
dHj 
-Uzz - Uzh 0 0 0 
0 0 
dT 
-Uzi - Uzh 0 0 0 
0 0 
dWj 
-(Wj + wJe -(T - Ij)e (T - j)e [(T - Ij).wj + (T - Ij).wj]e 
dw· 
0 0 (C + Z) 
J 
de 
- '_;.t{~ - -y.'f" ....... :: dp 
.lIS 
Let the above equation be simplified into matrix notation A *x = B*d. The manipulation 
"x/d = A-1*B" expresses each relationship d(choice variable)/d(exogenous variable) 
which are used in section 3. The results areJ3 : 
{{p (p (U~ - Ull Uzz ) + Ucz (p Ull- Uzl Wi) + Uel (-p Uzl + UzzWi) ), -P2Ull Uzh + 
p2 Ulh Uzl + P Ucz Ulh wi + P Uzh Uzl wi - P Ulh Uzz wi - Ucz Uzh w1 + P Uel (-p Ulh + Uzh Wi) , 
2 
8 (p (Uzl - Ull Uzz ) + Ucz (p Ull- Uzl Wi) + Uel (- P Uzl + Uzz Wi)) (Wi + Wj) , 
8 (T-1i) (p (U~ - UllUzz ) + Ucz (pUll- Uzl Wi) + Uel (-pUzl + UzzWi)) I 
8 (T- lj) (p (U~ - Ull Uzz ) + Ucz (pUll- Uzl Wi) + Uel (~p Uzl + UzzWi)) , 
(p (U~-UllUzz) +Ucz (pUll-UzlWi) +Uel (-pUzl+UzzWi)) ((T-1i) wi+ (T - lj) Wj), 
(C+ Z) (-pU~ + pUll Uzz + Ucz (-pUll + Uzl Wi) + Uel (pUzl - Uzz Wi))}, 
{ - p2 U~ + p2 Ull Uzz - P Ua:::: Uzl wi - U~ w1 + Ua:::: Uzz w1 + 
p Ucz (- P Ull + (Uel + 2 Uzl) Wi) + P Uel (p Uzl - 2 Uzz Wi) , 
p2 Ull Uzh - p2 Ulh Uzl- P Ua:::: Ulh wi + P Ucz Ulh Wi + Ua:::: Uzh wf + P Uel (p Ulh - 2 Uzh Wi) , 
8 (pU~ + pUczUll- Uel (pUzl + UczWi) + Ua:::: (-pUll + Uzl Wi)) (Wi + Wj), 
8 (T - li) (p U~ + pUcz Ull - Uel (pUzl + Ucz Wi) + Ua:::: (-p Ull + Uzl Wi)) , 
8 (T - 1 j) (p U~ + P Ucz Ull - Uel (p Uzl + Ucz Wi) + Ua:::: ( - P Ull + Uzl Wi) ) , 
(pU~ +pUczUll- Uel (pUzl+ UczWi) + Ua:::: (-pUll+ UzlWi)) ((T-1i) wi+ (T - lj) Wj), 
(C+ Z) (-p U~ - P Ucz Ull + Uel (p Uzl + Ucz Wi) + Ua:::: (p Ull - Uzl Wi) ) }, 
{p (p Uel (-Ucz + Uzz) + Ucz (-p Uzl + Ucz Wi) + Ua:::: (p Uzl - Uzz Wi) ) , 
p (p (Uel Uzh - Uzh Uzl + Ulh Uzz ) + Ua:::: (p Ulh - Uzh Wi) + Ucz (- 2 P Ulh + Uzh Wi) ) , 
-8 (pUel(Ucz- Uzz) + Ucz (pUzl- UczWi) + Ua:::: (-pUzl + UzzWi)) (Wi + Wj), 
-8 (T - li) (p Uel (Ucz - Uzz) + Ucz (p Uzl - Ucz Wi) + Ua:::: (- P Uzl + Uzz Wi) ) , 
-8 (T - lj) (p Uel (Ucz - Uzz) + Ucz (p Uzl - Ucz Wi) + Ua:::: (- P Uzl + Uzz Wi) ) , 
(pUel(Ucz-Uzz) +Ucz (pUzl-UczWi) +Ua::::(-pUzl+UzzWi)) ((-T+li) wi+ ( - T+lj) Wj), 
(C+Z) (pUel (Ucz-Uzz) +Ucz(pUzl-UczWi) +Ua:::: (-pUzl+UzzWi))}, 
{p (U~ Ull- 2 Uel Ucz Uzl + U~ Uzz + Ua:::: (U~ - Ull Uzz ) ) , p U~ Uzh + 
Ucz (p Ull Uzh + Ulh (- P Uzl + Ucz Wi)) - Uel (p (Uzh Uzl- Ulh Uzz ) + Ucz (p Ulh + Uzh Wi)) + 
, Ua:::: (-p Ull Uzh + Uzh Uzl Wi + Ulh (p Uzl- Uzz Wi)) , 
8 (U~ Ull- 2 Uel Ucz Uzl + U~ Uzz + Ua:::: (U~ - Ull Uzz )) (Wi + Wj) , 
8 (T - li) (U~z Ull - 2 Uel Ucz Uzl + U~ Uzz + Ua:::: (U~ - Ull Uzz ) ) , 
8 (T- lj) (U~ Ull- 2 Uel Ucz Uzl + U~ Uzz + Ua:::: (U~ - Ull Uzz ) ) , 
(U~ Ull - 2 Uel Ucz Uzl + U~ Uzz + Ua:::: (U~- Ull Uzz)) ((T - li) Wi + (T - lj) Wj) I 
- (C+ Z) (U~Ull- 2 Uel UczUzl + U~ Uzz + Ua:::: (U~ - UllUzz))}} 
13 The matrices are still in Mathematica form. To help understand, the brackets within the first opening 
bracket represents each row, and the commas represent columns in that row unless between an opening and 
closing of a bracket which signals a change to the next row. For example the 1 sl row and 1 sl column of 
matrix "a" is Vee, the lSI row 4th and last column is -p, the 2nd row 2nd column is Vzz and so on. 
l}J 
AppendixB 
An interesting speculation and one that will assuredly be raised is the question; is marital 
happiness exogenous? Outlining the question in functional form using the measurable 
variables are: 
L= f (X, D, V, Hm) 
V= q (X, D, L, Hm) 




The Y's (D's) are the set of variables that express marital happiness (Labor and home 
production) and are exogenous of the labor force and home production (marital 
happiness) function. So two stage least squares will be used to extract the endogeneity 
using the identification variables ofY and D. In other terms the instrumental variables Y 
and D will enable the separation of the correlation between the error term of the functions 
g and f (k) with respect to Hm (L, V) and then use the new value to find k (g and f). The 
new estimated equation will produce consistent estimates for the coefficients of the 
variables if marital happiness is endogenous to labor decisions. Therefore the two stages 
are first finding Hm Hat = v(X,Y,D), the reduced form, and then in the second stage 
estimating L=g(X,D,V,Hm Hat) and V = g(X,D,L,HmHat). Therefore Hm Hat has the 
statistical properties of the exogenous variables Y and D. The same is done to find LHat 
The arguments made against the technique come in the form of what to decide on 
being instrumental variables, Y and D. The identification variables hold two theoretical 
assumptions when being chosen that can be brought under scrutiny. The questioning is 
not only open to the assumption that they are exogeIlous as stated above, but also that 
there's a significant correlation between Y and Hm, and D and LN which is necessary to 
capture enough L and V in L hat and V hat, or H in Hm hat depending. After serious 
consideration and inspection the variables have been chosen carefully in order to satisfy 
the assumptions. The variables included in Yare: 
religious intensity, parent's marital status at 16, and difference in spouses' 
education14 
In interpreting the results, table 6.1 is the reduced form for equation 14 and table 
6.2 is the structural form. An important note to make early on is marital happiness has an 
R2 of .05 which is lower then the stated value of what personal happiness regressions run 
which is .10 as mentioned in the literature review. The primary reason for the drop is the 
I 
smaller variation in the variable as shown in figure 6. Plus, the variables are not the same 
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14 Years of marriage cannot be used because of the lack of measurement for those already divorced. 
e..= _ 
31 
Tables 9.1 is the reduced form for equation 15 and table 9.2 is the structural form. 
The major result is HID Hat is not correlated with home production which again confirms 
the results found in the econometric section of the paper. 
Table 7.1 and 10.1 breaks down marital happiness into a zero-one variable. The 
binary variable sets marital happiness to one if the respondent answered three, zero if 
they answered one, and excluded otherwise. The idea is to measure the extremes and 
create a higher R2 while seeing what happens. This alternative approach enables, the 
ability to run a probit regression while estimating marital happiness in the reduced form. 
It also makes sense because the coefficient for marital happiness in tables 5.1 or 5.2 is 
much smaller then in table 6.2 which means the the variables is blowing up within the 
reduced form and is lying outside of the possible answer choices. Therefore, the probit 
regression is used because it estimates the variable using a probabilistic function, one that 
curves within the small space of zero and one, instead of a straight line which at the 
extremes quite possibly lies outside the possibility of the answer choices. Therefore, the 
binary approach is insightful and possibly preferable. The alternative does produced a 
higher R2 as measured with the McFadden R-squared from .045 to .08. Also, the income 
variables and personal unemployment becomes a significant factor in measuring the 
variable. 
Other variations have been used between the choice of numbering the binary 
variable, ordered regressions, censored, and OLS for the whole and sub-sample but no 










































age of respondent 
age of respondent squared 
age of spouse 
Race black 
number of children 
number of years of schooling of respondent 
number of years of schooling of spouse 
difference in education between spouses in years, Edr - Eds 
income of family 
log of Faminc 
respondent's opinion of financial relative position, number 1 to 9, 9 high 
indicator of inflation, as a percentage 
respondent's opinion on marital happiness, 1 to 3, 3 high 
1 if hapmar = 3, 0 other wise 
1 ifhapmar = 3,0 ifhapmar = 1, NA otherwise 
respondents labor force participation in hours for that week 
spouses labor force participation in hours for that week 
respondents amount of effort in home production, weighted from 0-28 
spouses amount of effort in home production, 1-5 variable, 5 high 
Hwrkr- Hwrksp 
respondents personal income 
gender of respondent, 1 if male 
respondents marital situation, 1 if married 
Race other than black or white 
Respondent parents marital status at age 16, 1 if together 
respondents religious intensity, dummy, 1 if attend church weekly 
respondents occupation 
respondent works in industrial sector 
respondent works in a professional field 
respondent works in Service sector 
respondent works in transportation 






Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
HRSR 25.94 35.00 99.00 0.00 23.37 18501.00 
HAPM 2.59 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.59 18501.00 
AGE 45.58 43.00 99.00 18.00 15.60 18501.00 
AGESP 43.87 41.00 99.00 15.00 15.87 17430.00 
CHILDS 2.32 2.00 9.00 0.00 1.72 18501.00 
EDR 12.65 12.00 20.00 0.00 3.10 18454.00 
EDS 12.62 12.00 20.00 0.00 3.08 18297.00 
FAMINe 31.68 25.59 162.61 0.00 28.40 18501.00 
FINRELA 3.05 3.00 9.00 1.00 0.93 18501.00 
INC 13.60 6.03 201.64 0.00 19.84 18501.00 
MALE 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 18501.00 
PARTOG 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.42 18501.00 
BLACK 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28 18501.00 
OTHER 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 18501.00 
WHITE 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 18501.00 
RELINT 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 18501.00 
RUNEMP 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.14 18501.00 
HRSSP 26.88 38.00 99.00 0.00 23.38 18501.00 
HWRKR2 10.27 9.00 30.00 0.00 9.47 2192.00 
r 
Table 3: Correlations 
HRSR HAPM AGE AGESP CHILm EDR EDS FAMIN( FINREL INC MALE 
PARTO BLACK OTHER WHITE RELlNl RUNE 
HRSR 
HAPM .00 
AGE -.31 .02 
AGESP -.32 .01 .92 
CHILm -.13 -.05 .31 .27 
EDR .25 .05 -.21 -.20 -.22 
EDS .17 .07 -.22 -.19 -.20 .62 
FAMIN( .21 .04 -.07 -.07 -.03 .34 .32 
FINREL .13 .05 .04 .04 -.04 .27 .25 .33 
INC .48 .03 -.10 -.13 -.03 .29 .18 .61 .22 
MALE .34 .05 .09 .01 .00 .03 -.02 .05 .02 .37 
PARTO .03 .04 .01 .01 -.03 .11 .08 .07 .05 .05 .01 
BLACK .01 -.10 -.02 -.02 .08 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.08 -.04 .00 
-.12 
OTHER .02 .00 -.05 -.05 .01 .00 .00 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.01 
-.01 -.05 
WHITE -.02 .09 .04 .04 -.07 .07 .07 .09 .08 .04 .01 
.12 -.85 -.47 
" .10 -.01 -.01 -.05 -.02 -.08 -.11 .04 .08 .00 -.07 RELlNl -.09 .09 .11 .11 
RUNEi'll -.16 -.02 -.05 -.06 .00 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.09 -.01 .10 
-.01 .02 .01 -.02 -.04 
HRSSP .10 ":01 -.36 -.32 -.12 .16 .23 .17 .11 -.07 




Table 4: Covariances 
HRSR HAPM AGE AGESP CHILm EDR EDS FAMIN( FINREL INC MALE PARTO BLACK OTHER WHITE RELlNl RUNEI\ HRSS 
HRSR 545.69 
HAPM .01 .32 
AGE -112.57 .16 240.4 
AGESP -116.42 .06 224.8 250.24 
CHILm -5.31 -.05 8.17 7.28 2.89 
EDR 17.94 .08 -10.24 -9.6 -1.15 9.51 
EDS 12.42 .13 -10.24 -9.46 -1.06 5.87 9.41 
FAMIN( 141.8 .66 -29.72 -31.16 -1.39 29.69 28.42 814.77 
FINREL 2.84 .03 .51 .53 -.07 .75 .7 8.62 .82 
INC 222.9 .31 -32.15 -41.12 -1.16 17.95 11.08 345.62 4. 396.62 
MALE 3.95 .01 .72 .09 .00 .04 -.03 .7 .01 3.69 .25 
PARTO .26 .01 .08 .09 -.03 .14 .1 .84 .02 .44 .0026 .18 
BLACK .04 -.02 -.07 -.08 .04 -.07 -.07 -.66 -.02 -.21 -.0004 -.01 .08 
OTHER .09 .00 -.12 -.12 .003 .0007 -.0006 -.12 -.0024 -.03 -.0006 -.001 -.0024 .03 
WHITE -.13 .02 .2 .21 -.04 .07 .07 .78 .02 .24 .001 .02 -.08 -.02 .1 
RELlNl -1.01 .03 .86 .89 .08 -.02 -.01 -.67 -.01 -.75 -.03 .01 .01 .00 -.01 
.24 
RUNEI\ -.49 -.001 -.11 -.12 .00 -.02 -.02 -.19 -.01 -.03 .01 -.0006 .0006 .00 .00 
.00 .02 






Dependent Variable: HRSR 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 18:34 
Obs: 4606 35283 IF YEAR> 1974 YEAR < 1999 
AND MARRIED = 1 
Included observations: 14884 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
HAPM -0.491924 0.249647 -1.970478 0.049 
AGE 0.719254 0.066511 10.81409 0 
AGE_Sa -0.011165 0.000622 -17.93754 0 
AGESP -0.026377 0.024782 -1.064329 0.287 
CHILDS -0.61344 0.091292 -6.71953 0 
EDR 0.074353 0.059248 1.254941 0.21 
FAMINC -0.20959 0.011487 -18.24503 0 
FAMI NC_L 5.811557 0.401651 14.46916 0 
FINRELA 0.440316 0.188202 2.339595 0.019 
INC 0.462135 0.009742 47.43785 0 
MALE 10.86538 0.375914 28.90392 0 
BLACK 2.168467 0.512466 4.231436 0 
OTHER 1.221637 0.874307 1.397262 0.162 
RUNEMP -31.50583 1.022324 -30.81786 0 
HRSSP 0.065562 0.007399 8.860447 0 
ROCCCLE 1.251241 0.449915 2.781058 0.005 
ROCCCRP 1.564143 0.525141 2.978517 0.003 
ROCCFAR 5.480245 0.96593 5.673546 0 
ROCCMA~ 4.587398 0.433217 10.58913 0 
ROCCOPE 2.348529 0.553499 4.243062 0 
ROCCSER 2.049958 0.516843 3.966308 1E-04 
ROCCTRA 2.80162 0.65462 4.279768 0 
YEAR 0.120954 0.049487 2.444167 0.015 
GDPDEFL -0.408351 0.136031 -3.001899 0.003 
UNEMPRJI -0:023168 0.123707 -0.187281 0.851 
C -244.9276 99.04672 -2.472849 0.013 
R-squared 0.463176 Mean dependent va 26.41 
Adjusted R 0.462273 S.D. dependentvar 23.22 
S.E. of regl 17.0295 Akaike info criterion 8.51 
Sum squar 4308875 Schwarz criterion 8.523 
Log likelihc -63301.82 F -statistic 512.8 
Durbin-Wa 1.94533 Prob( F -statistic} 0 
p. ,)0 
Table 5.2 
Dependent Variable: HRSR 
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 18:34 
Obs: 4606 35283 IF YEAR> 1974 YEAR < 1999 
AND MARRIED = 1 
Left censoring (value) at zero 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
HAPM -0.440441 0.395754 -1.11292 0.266 
AGE 2.076663 0.119018 17.44838 0 
AGE_SQ -0.028183 0.001192 -23.6531 0 
AGESP -0.074298 0.03883 -1.91342 0.056 
CHILDS -1.138563 0.151181 -7.53115 0 
EDR 0.244289 0.096216 2.53895 0.011 
FAMINC -0.38862 0.01926 -20.1773 0 
FAMINC_L 11.79874 0.709992 16.61813 0 
FINRELA 0.826235 0.298066 2.771985 0.006 
INC 0.641742 0.015404 41.66023 0 
MALE 13.98479 0.59415 23.5375 0 
BLACK 3.66933 0.803329 4.567656 0 
OTHER 1.684669 1.350824 1.247142 0.212 
HRSSP 0.115622 0.011673 9.905116 0 
ROCCCLE 3.435756 0.726877 4.726736 0 
ROCCCRP 3.09982 0.829803 3.735608 2E-04 
ROCCFAR 10.65032 1.545461 6.891355 0 
ROCCMA~ 7.869785 0.67975 11.57748 0 
ROCCOPE 3.553229 0.903256 3.933801 1 E-04 
ROCCSER 5.708306 0.834887 6.837217 0 
ROCCTRA 4.135458 1.02967 4.016294 1E-04 
YEAR 0.156321 0.078593 1.988992 0.047 
GDPDEFL -0.664034 0.216517 -3.06688 0.002 
UNEMPRJI -0.128173 0.195914 -0.65423 0.513 
C -366.0034 157.3052 -2.32671 0.02 
Error Distribution 
SCALE:C(~ 24.84496 0.196664 126.332 0 
R-squared 0.400948 Mean dependent va 26.41 
Adjusted R 0.39994 S.D. dependentvar 23.22 
S.E. of reg I 17.98945 Akaike info criterion 6.356 
Sum squar 4808353 Schwarz criterion 6.369 
LoglikeIihc -47272.34 Hannan-Quinn criter 6.36 
Avg~ i6g-rik -3.176051 
Left censor 5491 Right censored obs 0 
Uncensore 9393 Totalobs 14884 
Table 6.1 
Dependent Variable: HAPM 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 18:42 
Obs: 4606 35283 IF YEAR> 1974 AND YEAR < 1999 
AND MARRIED = 1 
Included observations: 14791 after adjusting endpoints 






























Adjusted R 0.039661 
S.E. of reg I 0.554261 
Sum squar 4535.269 
Log likelihc -12245.04 
Durbin-Wa 1.929513 
0.002178 -3.511918 4E-04 
2.04E-05 5.619107 0 
0.00081 -2.924793 0.004 
0.002998 -5.371252 0 
0.002226 4.601329 0 
0.000376 0.846585 0.397 
0.013183 0.878486 0.38 
0.00615 1.835727 0.066 
0.00032 -0.676747 0.499 
0.012307 6.187479 0 
0.016911 -11.65637 0 
0.028632 0.032403 0.974 
0.033295 -0.851724 0.394 
0.000242 1.041395 0.298 
0.009548 13.42319 0 
0.01103 2.442024 0.015 
0.002016 -6.289855 0 
0.014675 2.100169 0.036 
0.017154 0.309734 0.757 
0.031514 -0.527295 0.598 
0.01414 1.096458 0.273 
0.018145 -0.402235 0.688 
0.016906 -0.390633 0.696 
0.021414 -0.215878 0.829 
0.001618 -0.272761 0.785 
0.004442 2.086844 0.037 
0.004043 -0.305107 0.76 
3.237783 1.034558 0.301 
Mean dependent va 
S.D. dependent var 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 









Dependent Variable: HRSR 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 18:42 
Obs: 4606 35283 IF YEAR > 1974 YEAR < 1999 
AND MARRIED = 1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
H_HAT -6.021907 2.010768 -2.99483 0.003 
AGE 0.696365 0.068395 10.18149 0 
AGE_Sa -0.010738 0.000665 -16.1352 0 
AGESP -0.03874 0.025287 -1.53203 0.126 
CHILDS -0.703046 0.096671 -7.27254 0 
EDR 0.097673 0.060371 1.617872 0.106 
FAMINC -0.207458 0.011554 -17.9554 0 
FAMINC_L 5.926653 0.405318 14.62222 0 
FINRELA 0.468876 0.190621 2.459723 0.014 
INC 0.457501 0.009813 46.62038 0 
MALE 11.29101 . 0.400441 28.19647 0 
BLACK 1.112092 0.635269 1.750583 0.08 
OTHER 1.126823 0.879527 1.28117 0.2 
RUNEMP -31.80486 1.025816 -31 .0045 0 
HRSSP 0.066233 0.007463 8.875194 0 
ROCCCLE 1.341811 0.455315 2.946996 0.003 
ROCCCRJ! 1.518937 0.52676 2.883546 0.004 
ROCCFAR 5.3381'01 0:9'68185 5.513511 0 
ROCCMA~ 4.606902 0.434889 10.59328 0 
ROCCOPE 2.269711 0.557408 4.071902 0 
ROCCSER 1.926157 0.51993 3.704647 2E-04 
ROCCTRA 2.642368 0.658143 4.014886 1E-04 
YEAR 0.118827 0.049652 2.393182 0.017 
GDPDEFL -0.361876 0.137457 -2.63264 0.009 
UNEMPR.A -0.006579 0.124162 -0.05299 0.958 
C -226.7557 99.63268 -2.27592 0.023 
R-squared 0.463084 Mean dependent va 26.46 
Adjusted R 0.462175 S.D. dependentvar 23.22 
S.E. of regl 17.02769 Akaike info criterion 8.509 
Sum squar 4280997 Schwarz criterion 8.523 
Log likelihc -62904.64 F-statistic 509.4 
Durbin-Wa 1.940905 Prob(F-statistic) 0 
.~~." ~"( , ....r. 
fJ. vV 
Table 7.1 Table 7.2 
Dependent Variable: HAPMBIN2 Dependent Variable: HRSR 
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 18:58 Date: 03/11/02 Time: 19:05 
Sample(adjusted): 4606 35283 IF YEAR> 1974 AND YEJObs: 4606 35283 IF YEAR> 1974 YEAR < 1999 
AND MARRIED = 1 AND MARRIED = 1 
Included observations: 9727 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 





























Mean depe 0.960728 
S.E. of regl 0.190739 
Sum squar 352.8645 
Log likelihc -1480.916 
Restr. log I -1611.025 
LR statistic 260.218 
Probability( 0 
0.012708 -2.981719 0.003 
0.00013 4.124814 0 
0.004171 -1.714426 0.087 
0.015305 -2.436985 0.015 
0.011544 3.232485 0.001 
0.00187 -1.174641 0.24 
0.058878 2.219382 0.027 
0.031794 1.169903 0.242 
0.001723 -1 .584208 0.113 
0.067109 5.698776 0 
0.073411 -7.811364 0 
0.133537 -1.545299 0.122 
0.156329 -1.152829 0.249 
0.00128 1.630606 0.103 
0.052338 4.830877 0 
0.055388 2.427707 0.015 
0.010489 -3.821536 1E-04 
0.079873 2.19778 0.028 
0.101074 1.630243 0.103 
0.215785 1.337452 0.181 
0.075647 0.419816 0.675 
0.09073 0.245301 0.806 
0.083035 -0.024849 0.98 
0.10946 -0.209246 0.834 
0.008635 0.309239 0.757 
0.023609 0.544245 0.586 
0.021642 -0.269994 0.787 
17.27421 -0.227315 0.82 
S.D. dependent var 0.194 
Akaike info criterion 0.31 
Schwarz criterion 0.331 
Hannan-Quinn critel 0.317 
Avg. log likelihood -0.152 
McFadden R-squan 0.081 
Obswith D 
Obswith D 
382 Totalobs 9727 
9345 
Left censoring (value) at zero 
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
H_HATBIN -1.414268 0.019213 -73.6095 0 
AGE 1.747983 0.0965 18.11385 0 
AGE_SQ -0.023925 0.000966 -24.7616 0 
AGESP -0.084368 0.031491 -2.67913 0.007 
CHILDS -1 .038942 0.123433 -8.41708 0 
EDR 0.141069 0.07855 1.795905 0.073 
FAMINC -0.367496 0.015649 -23.4831 0 
FAMINC_L 10.99868 0.57889 18.9996 0 
FINRELA 0.794239 0.242091 3.280749 0.001 
INC 0.633349 0.012556 50.44339 0 
MALE 13.64298 0.482217 28.29223 0 
BLACK 2.325506 0.656298 3.543371 4E-04 
OTHER 1.97199 1.102168 1.79E+00 0.074 
HRSSP 0.120805 0.009515 12.69562 0 
ROCCCLE 2.383215 0.592516 4.022193 1E-04 
ROCCCR}! 2.123621 0.673454 3.153327 0.002 
ROCCFAR 6.72215 1.261055 5.330577 0 
ROCCMA~ 7.260704 0.551362 13.16866 0 
ROCCOPE 3.002543 0.73844 4.06606 0 
ROCCSER 5.012133 0.681985 7.349335 0 
ROCCTRA 2.745037 0.836862 3.280154 0.001 
YEAR 0.172518 0.063828 2.702835 0.007 
GDPDEFL -0.48372 0.175755 -2.75225 0.006 
UNEMPR,o -0.042603 0.159081 -0.26781 0.789 
C -389.3722 127.7456 -3.04803 0.002 
SCALE:C(= 19.85228 0.155188 127.9244 0 
R-squared 0.584003 
Adjusted R 0.583299 
S.E. of regl 14.98813 
Sum squar 3316868 
Log"liKelihc -44463.28 
Avg. log lik -3.006104 
Mean dependent va 26.46 
S.D. dependent var 23.22 
Akaike info criterion 6.016 
Schwarz criterion 6.029 
Hannan-Quinn criter 6.02 
Left censor 
Uncensore 
5439 Right censored obs 0 
9352 Totalobs 14791 
Table 8.1 
Dependent Variable: HWRKR2 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 19:05 
Sample(adjusted): 29391 35282 IF (YEAR > 1993 AND YEAR < 1997) 
AND MARRIED = 1 AND HAPM > 0 
Included observations: 1895 after adjusting endpoints 

























Adjusted R 0.094805 
S.E. of regl 8.920128 
Sum squar 148952.6 

























Mean dependent va 
S.D.dependentvar 


































Table 9.1 Table 9.2 
Dependent Variable: HAPM Dependent Variable: HWRKR2 
Method: Least Squares Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 19:05 Date: 03/11/02 Time: 19:05 
Sample(adjusted): 29391 35283 IF (YEAR > 1993 AND Y Obs: 29391 35282 IF YEAR> 1993 YEAR < 1997 
AND MARRIED = 1 AND HAPM > 0 AND MARRIED = 1 AND HAPM > 0 
Included observations: 2487 after adjusting endpoints 



























Adjusted R 0.040827 
S.E. of reg I 0.527459 
Sum squar 684.9603 



























Mean dependent va 
S.D. dependentvar 
Akaike info criterion 
Schwarz criterion 
F-statistic 

























































Adjusted R 0.091811 
S.E. of regl 8.924246 
Sum squar 148214.1 

























Mean dependent va 
S.D.dependentvar 


































Table 10.1 Table 10.2 
Dependent Variable: HAPMBIN2 Dependent Variable: HWRKR2 
Method: ML - Ordered Probit (Quadratic hill climbing) Method: Least Squares 
Date: 03/11/02 Time: 19:05 Date: 03/11/02 Time: 19:14 
Sample(adjusted): 29391 35283 IF (YEAR> 1993 AND Y Obs: 29391 35282 IF YEAR> 1993 YEAR < 1997 
AND MARRIED = 1 AND HAPM > 0 AND MARRIED = 1 AND HAPM > 0 
Included observations: 1577 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of ordered indicator values: 2 
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
AGE -0.071171 0.03887 -1.831021 0.067 
AGE_SQ 0.000755 0.000402 1.879889 0.06 
AGESP 0.009772 0.013269 0.736466 0.461 
CHILDS -0.043241 0.047103 -0.918007 0.359 
EDR 0.013584 0.033628 0.403952 0.686 
FAMINC -0.000301 0.005599 -0.053694 0.957 
FAMINC_L -0.080416 0.215556 -0.373066 0.709 
FINRELA 0.038571 0.088756 0.434577 0.664 
INC -0.003484 0.004215 -0.826539 0.409 
MALE 0.39058 0.16998 2.297801 0.022 
BLACK -0.823008 0.197154 -4.174438 0 
OTHER -0.232223 0.26029 -0.892169 0.372 
RUNEMP -0.09269 0.554713 -0.167096 0.867 
HRSSP -1.82E-05 0.003471 -0.005251 0.996 
RELINT 0.056658 0.131698 0.430211 0.667 
PARTOG 0.273508 0.136199 2.008147 0.045 
ED_DIF -0.077014 0.028816 -2.672597 0.008 
ROCCCLE -0.134791 0.212659 -0.633835 0.526 
ROCCCR)! -0.387018 0.258204 -1.498886 0.134 
ROCCFAR 6.003197 811179.2 7.40E-06 1 
ROCCMA~ -0.181637 0.202146 -0.89854 0.369 
ROCCOPE -0.206078 0.275787 -0.747236 0.455 
ROCCSER -0.281434 0.230509 -1.220925 0.222 
ROCCTRA -0.488685 0.268167 -1.822319 0.068 
Limit Points 
LIMIT _1 :CI -2.981826 
Akaike info 0.318775 
Log likelihc -226.3544 
Restr. log I -251.7411 
LR statistic 50.7733 
Probability( 0.001128 
0.969143 -3.076764 0.002 
Schwarz criterion 0.404 
Hannan-Quinn critel 0.35 
Avg. log likelihood -0.144 
LR index (Pseudo-J:; 0.101 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
H_HATBIN -0.433845 0.426187 -1.01797 0.309 
AGE -0.059769 0.128053 -0.46675 0.641 
AGE_SQ 0.000947 0.001191 0.795574 0.426 
AGESP -0.037548 0.050531 -0.74306 0.458 
CHILDS 0.701471 0.190708 3.678236 2E-04 
EDR 0.070404 0.114056 0.617281 0.537 
FAMINC 0.01696 0.021041 0.806047 0.42 
FAMINC_L -0.404214 0.806599 -0.50113 0.616 
FINRELA -0.216151 0.355758 -0.60758 0.544 
INC -0.026411 0.017 -1.55359 0.121 
MALE -4.095489 0.653899 -6.26319 0 
BLACK -1.255691 1.166499 -1.07646 0.282 
OTHER 1.172615 1.211709 0.967736 0.333 
RUNEMP -0.209978 2.223063 -0.09445 0.925 
HRSSP 0.039908 0.013582 2.938409 0.003 
ROCCCLE 0.200619 0.818042 0.245243 0.806 
ROCCCRP -0.95059 1.033978 -0.91935 0.358 
ROCCFAR -0.912268 1.994158 -0.45747 0.647 
ROCCMA~ -0.937296 0.825641 -1.13523 0.257 
ROCCOPE 0.359373 1.165218 0.308417 0.758 
ROCCSER -0.862195 0.971505 -0.88749 0.375 
ROCCTRA -1.788949 1.182313 -1.51309 0.131 
C 13.26063 3.557131 3.727901 2E-04 
R-squared 0.107586 Mean dependent va 10.03 
Adjusted R 0.090661 S.D. dependent var 9.135 
S.E. of regl 8.711088 Akaike info criterion 7.186 
Sum squar 88024.34 Schwarz criterion 7.285 
Log likelihc -4227.709 F -statistic 6.357 
Durbin-Wa 1.845548 Prob(F-statistic) 0 
